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LIMITATIONS ON STATE JURISDICTION
TO LEVY DEATH TAXES
DAVIS W. MORTON, JR.* AND ALBERT H. COTTON"
"The theoretical basis of sonic decisions in the very practical
matter of taxation is not particularly satisfying. But a switch of ab-
stract concepts is hardly to be expected without at least careful con-
sideration of its impact on the very practical and concrete problems
of states and taxpayers. Weighing the highly doctrinaire reasons
advanced for this decision against its practical effects on our economy
and upon our whole constitutional law of state taxation, I can see
nothing in the court's decision more useful than the proverbial leap
from the frying pan into the fire." Jackson, J., dissenting, in State
Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 195 (1942).
The judicial protest quoted above highlights one of the most confusing
problems arising under our constitutional system-the jurisdiction of one
or more states to tax personal property transfers at death.
Actually, it is only because of congressional action that state death
taxes have survived at all. In the early 1920's, some states, in an effort to
attract wealthy residents, repealed their state death taxes. The movement
seemed likely to spread, and it appeared that states which had traditionally
used inheritance taxes as a source of revenue might be forced to repeal their
taxes in self-defense. In 1924, to check this movement Congress granted a
25% credit on the federal estate tax to those states levying death taxes, and
in 1926 this was raised to 80%.
This device was successful. Today all states levy death taxes which at
least exhaust the federal credit, except Nevada.2 There is no saving in
moving to Nevada, however, since the federal government will take the
money which Nevada declines.
State death taxes having been saved from extinction by congressional
action, an old problem was intensified -how to prevent the states from
going too far-how to prevent two, three, or even four states from taxing
the same estate. Everyone agreed, including the most enthusiastic advo-
cates of death taxes on social grounds. that one death tax was enough-
that the burden of death taxes should be increased, if at all, by an increase
in rates and not by a haphazard imposition of double taxation on a few
estates. For a period, acting under the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment, the Supreme Court assumed the responsibility for preventing
*A.B., L.L.B., Syracuse; L.L.M., Yale; Member of the New York Bar.
"A.B., L.L.B., Duke; Assistant Professor of Law, T. C. Williams School of Law,
University of Richmond; Member of the North Carolina Bar.
1. INT. REV. CoDE § 813(b). Held constitutional in Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S.
12 (1927).
2. The CCH STATE INIIERITANCE, ESTATE & GIFT TAx SERVICE sets out, with
statutory references, the "death taxes" enacted by each state.
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double taxation. It was the court's withdrawal from this field, so far as
intangibles were concerned, that provoked Mr. Justice Jackson's protest
quoted above.
The Aldrich case3 involved the right of Utah to levy a death tax on
stock in the Union Pacific Railroad owned by Edward S. Harkncss, a resi-
dent of New York. The sole basis of Utah's claim was that the Union
Pacific had been incorporated in that state. Assuming that the situs of a
share of stock is in the state of incorporation, Utah's right to tax would be
clear, if intangibles are to be treated in the same manner as tangible per-
sonal property was treated in Frick v. Pennsylvania.4 Assuming, however,
that the maxim ;nobilia sequuntur personam applies, New York, and New
York alone, would have the right to tax. Or is it any of the Supreme Court's
business anyway?
The court chose the third alternative. The right or duty of the court
to attempt to prevent double taxation had been under a cloud from the
beginning. In the early case of Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,5
Mr. Justice Holmes said: "It seems to me that the result reached by the
court probably is a desirable one, but I hardly understand how it can be
deduced from the 14th Amendment ...... The doubt had persisted, and
was repeated in later cases, including First National Bank of Boston v.
Maine," the case specifically overruled by the Aldrich case.
The court was not unaware of the practical difficulties which its with-
drawal from the field might cause. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring
opinion, suggested both reciprocal legislation and action under the Compact
Clause.7 Mr. Justice Jackson warned that the decision might "give a new
impetus to federal absorption of this revenue source and to federal incor-
poration of large enterprises."" Other proposals were made by students
of the problem.9
3. 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
4. 268 U.S. 473 (1925
5. 199 U.S. 194 (1905
6. 284 U.S. 312 (19325.
7. 316 U.S. 174, 182 (1942).
8. 1d. at 197.
9. The following proposals have been brought forward from time to time as possible
solutions to this practical conflict between the taxing powers and revenue needs of the
several states and the fiscal requirements of a unified national economy:
1. Continued state taxation of personal property at death buttressed by a
power of arbitration granted to the taxing authorities of the individual states.
Thiis is the approach of the UNIFORM AR1ITRATION OF DEATH TAXES ACT, 9
UNIFORM LAws ANN. 254 (Pocket Supp.) and similar statntes.
2. The imposition of one Federal Estate Tax and the granting of an 80%
state death tax credit only to states imposing death taxes on intangibles in ac-
cordance with federal stipulations as to the scope of such taxes.
3. The federal incorporation of large enterprises, as suggested by Mr.
justice Jackson in the Aldrich dissenting opinion.
4. Interstate compacts, under the Compact Clause, U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10,
cl. 3, as suggested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in the
Aldrich case.
5. Reciprocal legislation, also suggested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and
actually the most widely adopted solution. Utah, for example, enacted a recipro-
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The practical answer to the Aldrich case, of course, would be to re-
incorporate the Union Pacific in a state such as Delaware, which does not
assert a right to levy a death tax on the shareholders of its corporations,'0
and give up the Utah charter. Utah forestalled such a result by amending
its laws to give up the right to tax conferred by the Aldrich case." On the
other hand, New York amended its laws to open the way to double taxation,
since at the time of the Aldrich case it had given a credit for taxes paid to
other states, so that New York, rather than the taxpayer, had been the
actual loser.12
The practical problem presented by the Aldrich case has been almost
completely solved today. No state asserts the unqualified right to tax the
intangible personal property of non-residents at death. 3  In some cases
this result is reached because the law is applied only to real and tangible
cat provision after the Aldrich decision. U-rAi LAws, 1943, amending Uran
CODE ANN. § 80-12-9.
6. The exercise of legislative self-restraint, in not attempting to impose a
death tax on the intangibles of non-domiciliaries.
7. Adoption of a United States Constitutional Amendment to apply the
due process limitation of the 14th Amendment expressly to state jurisdiction to
tax personalty at death.
8. An overruling of the Aldrich decision. This seems unlikely in the near
future, since Mr. Justice Jackson was joined only by Mr. Justice Roberts in dis-
sent.
For the distant future - the field is one which abounds in overruled cases.
For detailed conslderation of some of the above proposals, see Rodell, A Primer on
Interstate Taxation, 44 YALE L.J. 1166, 1181-1185 (1935); Hellerstein and Hennefeld,
State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 HAv. L. Riv. 949, 973-975 (1941); Brown,
The Present Status of Multiple Taxation of Intangible Property, 40 Micn. L. REV. 806,
829-830 (1942); Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution -
A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925); SEN. Doc. No. 69, 78th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) Program of the Committee on Intergovernmental Fiscal Re-
lations.
10. The DEL. CoNs. Art. IX, § 6 prohibits taxation of shares of stock of corpora-
tions incorporated in that state. New York had a similar constitutional provis:on denying
itself the right to tax a trust because of the trustee's residence in the state. N.Y. CONST.
Art. XVI, § 3. In Delaware, the incorporation business, and in New York, the trust
business, are of greater economnc importance to the state than the revenue that might be
raised by an attempt at double taxation.
11. UTAI CODE ANN. § 80-12-9, as amended.
12. N.Y.L. c. 710, § 1 (1930), amended, Laws 1934 c. 639, § 1; McKINNEY'S CON-
SOL. LAWS, C 60, Bk. 59, Thx LAw, § 249-0. This section was repealed by Laws 1940, c.
138. For the present provision see ±IicKINNEY, Op. cit., Ciym. ANN. PT. § 249-0.
13. CCII STATE INHERITANCE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SERVICE 12,080 sum-
marizes the law of all American jurisdictions. Puerto Rico is the only one which does
generally tax intangibles of non-residents. The Georgia act, CA. CoDE § 92-3401(a) is
the least satisfactory, since it is an apportionment rather than a reciprocity statute, arid
does not distinguish between tangibles and intangibles. It reads: "The amount of tax
to be paid shall be in proportion to the amount of property located in this state as com-
pared to the total located elsewhere." Obviously, it contemplates that all property shall
have only one location, and, as administered, would not appear to create serious diffi-
culties. The Attorney-General, for example, has ruled that bank deposits have a situs
at the domicil of the depositor, thus eliminating double taxation in that instance. CCH
STATE INNERirANCE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SEVICE, Georgia, 1680.
The Nebraska law is also unsatisfactory, in that it does tax intangibles of non-
residents if they have a business situs in the state, and the non-resident also owns real
property in the state. Nebraska adopted the Uniform Reciprocal Transfer Act in 1945,
NEn. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2007.01, 77-2007.02, repealed it in 1949, and its re-enactment
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personal property of non-residents, 4 Some of these provisions were adopted
when the court would have held any other provision unconstitutional, and
were not changed after the Aldrich case.", Others have been adopted
since the court gave permission to tax.16
Other states have adopted reciprocity provisions. A Uniform Recip-
rocal Transfer Act was proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1928, and is in force at present in 15 states and two territories 7
The adoptions came immediately after the act was proposed. Of the states
which have adopted reciprocity since the Aldrich case, only South Dakota
has used the Uniform Act.' 8
There are two difficulties with the reciprocity approach. The first is
that in those states where the statute omits the section of the Uniform Act
granting the exemption to those states which do not tax intangibles of non-
residents, and contains only the reciprocity provision, it might be held that
the statute grants reciprocity only to those states which have adopted reci-
is now pending at the present session of the Nebraska Legislature. CCH STATE INJiER-
ITANCE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SERVICE 86501.
Other states having a business situs exception in their reciprocity statutes which may
cause difficulty are the District of Columbia (but no tax on trusts or stocks) and Ken-
tucky with a similar exemption. The North Carolina statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2,
relinquishes the. power to tax intangibles of non-residents, unless North Carolina is the
business situs, and specifically provides that trusts with a North Carolina trustee are not
taxable. The Attorney-General has ruled that the fact of incorporation in North Carolina
is not alone sufficient to give a North Carolina business situs (June 15, 1950) and that
bonds of a North Carolina corporation kept in a safe deposit box outside the state do
not have a North Carolina business situs. (June 20, 1950). CCII STATE INHERITANCE,
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SERVICE 17,227 and 17,228.
14. Virginia is typical of this group. VA. CODE Section 58-189 levies the death tax on
"real estate or tangible personal property" and Section 58-208 repeats that the tax applies to
real and tangible personal property only. States which do not tax the intangible personal
property of non-residents include Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia and Vashington. CCII STATE INHERI-
TANCE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SERVICE Y 12,080.
15. 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
16. See Kelly v. Bastedo, 70 Ariz. 371, 220 P.2d 1069 (1950), where the court up-
held a tax on the stock in an Arizona corporation owned by a non-resident who died in
1941, relying on the Aldrich case, supra, but called attention to the fact that the law was
changed in 1943 by ARIZ. CODE § 40-113.
17. 9 UNIFORm LAws ANN. 621, Pocket Supp. 287. States having the Uniforn Act
are: Alaska, California (where it is unnecessary since California does not tax the in-
tangibles of non-residents in any event) Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland,
Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, West
Virginia and Wyoming. Other states with reciprocity provisions are Arkansas, Colorado,
Kansas, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Utah and Wisconsin. CCH STATE IN ERI-
TANCE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SERVICE 12,080. Florida is among the states which
adopts both approaches. Under FLA. STAT. § 198.03 there is no tax on intangibles
of non-residents at death, and § 198.44 further provides for reciprocity. The reaction of
Mississippi to the Aldrich case is interesting: "Notwithstanding the decision in Aldrich
v. State Tax Commission of Utah, Mississippi will continue to adhere to the theory of
single taxation, as announced in First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 285 U.S. 312."
Letter of State Tax Commission, Sept. 11, 1942, quoted in CCIH STATE INHERITANCE,
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SERVICE, Mississippi, 1675.
18. S.D. Laws (1945) c. 198.
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procity statutes, and withholds it from those which have reached the same
result in other ways.'0
The second is that thcre is a possibility that local tax collectors20 and
state courts21 may, on some facts, hold the reciprocity statutes inapplicable,
and double taxation may still rcsult.
The Supreme Court has held.that no federal question is presented by
the application - or failure in application - of state reciprocity statutes;
there is no compact nor contract.22 If the states fail to follow their own
reciprocity statutes, or differ in their interpretation, there is no federal
remedy.
Another device, preventing loss to taxpayers, is the giving of credit for
taxes paid in other states. This is the device that saved the Harkness estate
from actual loss as the result of the Aldrich decision .2 It is no longer of
great importance, since under the present exemption and reciprocity statutes,
such double taxes should not be levied to begin with.
While the states have been adopting reciprocity statutes and granting
exemptions to the property of non-residents, there has also been a movement
for the greater co-operation among the states in the actual collection of the
taxes they do decide to collect. At the present time 27 states have legisla-
tion providing for the reciprocal enforcement of death taxes.24
The Aldrich decision also threw doubt upon the tax status of tangible
personal property, which was not definitely settled until the two decisions
19. CCII STATE INHERITANCE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SERVICE 1680-1680E.
T'he preferable rule, of course, is that the absence of a tax meets the requirements of
reciprocity. In re Eilermann Estate, 179 Wash. 15, 35 P.2d 763 (1934), and In re
Uihlen's Estate, 247 Vis. 476, 20 N.V.2d 120 (1945). Cf. the situation in Iowa, due
to language added to the Uniform Act in the Iowa statute, IowA CODE ANN. § 450.91,
indicating that the property must be taxed at the domicil, discussed in CCH STATE
INhIERiTANCE EsTATE, AND GIFT 'FAX SERVICE, Iowa, 1680, and under the Vis-
consin statute, Wis. STAT. § 72.01(9) where there is a complete exemption from taxation
in the foreign state. Estate of 1. L. Robbins, Vis. Sup. Ct., Jan. 9. 1951, and Estate of
M. E. Stewart, Wis. Sup. Ct., [an. 9, 1951. In re Robbins' Estate, 45 N.AV.2d 678
(Wis. 1951) and In re Stewart's Estate, 45 NAV.2d 637 (Wis. 1951).
20. "At the present time Pennsylvania has reciprocity with all other states of the
United States, Panama and Ilawaii.' Letter, Department of Revenue, Oct. 26, 1949,
quoted in CCH STATE INHERITANCE, ESTATE AND GirT TAX SERvICE. Pennsylvania,
1 1680. On the other hand, in 1947, Colorado listed Alabama. District of Columbia,
Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Puerto Rico. Rhode Island and Wis-
consin as not meeting the requirements of the Colorado reciprocity statute, with a note
that Alabama, Massachusetts and Wisconsin attempt reciprocity. CCII STATE INHERI-
TANCE, ESTATE AND Ciur TAX SERVICE, Colorado 1680. For a casc showing the
results of a mistaken belief by administrative officials of New York that that state did
not have reciprocity with Pennsylvania, see Plait v. Vagncr, 347 Pa. 27, 31 A.2d 499
(1943).
21. See Wisconsin cases, supra note 19.
22. Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939). Missouri repealed the UNIFORM
REcIPROCAL TRANSFEt ACT, Mo. LA.s, 1939, p. 182. § I, and is now a jurisdiction
which does not levy a tax on the intangibles of non-residents, snupra note 14.
23. Sub~ra note 12.
24. CCII STATE INHERITANCE, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX SERvICE 12,030. The
states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.
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in Treichler v. Wisconsin in 1949 and 1950. ''  Logically, under the mobilia
sequuntur personam rule, there is no reason why the state of domicil could
not tax tangible as well as intangible property of its residents. Historically,
the states had done so until the decision in Frick v. PennsylvaniaY0  Would
the court withdraw from this field, as it had in the case of death taxes on
intangibles?
A definite answer was given in the Treichler case.27 Frick v. Pennsyl-
vania2  was adhered to, and it was held that the 14th Amendment prohibits
the state of domicil from levying a death tax on tangible personal property
physically located in another state. Only Mr. justice Black continued to
doubt that the 14th Amendment had anything to do with the problem.2
Logically, the difference in treatment for constitutional purposes seems dit-
ficult to defend,30 but at least we have a detinite answer. There can be no
double taxation of personal property at death: in the case of tangible prop-
erty, because the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court, forbids it, and
assigns the right to tax to the state of the situs of the property; in the case
of intangible property, even though the Constitution is silent, because the
states, by unanimous consent have agreed to forego the right to double
taxation, and assigned the right to tax to the state of domicil.
Despite the repudiation of double taxation, a very real danger still
exists because of the possibility of "double domicil." Theoretically, by
definition, a man can have but one domicil at a time.' Actually, the way
Americans move around, it is often most difficult to determine where their
domicil is, and no wonder that courts, purporting to follow the same rules,
25. 338 U.S. 251 (1949); on remand, 257 Wis. 439, 43 N.W.2d 428 (1950),
aff'd mern. 71 Sup. Ct. 120 (1950).
26. 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
27. Supra note 25.
28. Supra note 26.
29. 338 U.S. 251, 257 (1949).
30. See Bittker, The Taxation of Out-of.State Tangible Property, 56 YALE L.J.
640 (1946). As a practical matter, however, the Supreme Court's inconsistency is more
defensible. The Louisiana statutes Will illustrate the point. Louisiana gave up any claim
to tax intangibles of non-domiciliaries without any strings of reciprocity. LA. ACT 67 of
1940, § I, DART'S STATS. (Supp. 1949) § 8556.1. Nevertheless, despite Frick v. Penn-
sylvania, supra, Louisiana still asserts the right to tax the tangibles of its residents, where-
ever located. (DART'S SrATS. [1939] § 8557). See Champagne, jurisdiction to Levy
Inheritance Taxes, 10 LA. L. REV. 519 (1950). In the Aldrich case, the court is per-
mitting the states to return to the traditional mobilia rule, if they so desire. In Frick
v. Pennsylvania and Treichler itis insisting on avoiding double taxation by regarding
tangibles as analogous to land, and abandoning the traditional mobilia rule. Is there more
justification for judicial interference where the solution is to be the adoption of an in-
novation than where it is to be a return to tradition?
31. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws, § 11 (1934). The notion that a man
could have two domiciles was described as "monstrous" as long ago as Somerville v. Lord
Somerville, 5 Ves. 750 (Clt. 1801). Difficulties in determining domicil are discussed in
Tweed and Sargent, Death and Taxes are Cartain-But What of Domicil?, 53 I-LxRv. L.
REv. 68 (1939) and practical suggestions for avoiding the double domicil trap are made
in Cuternian, Avoidance of Double Death Taxation of Estates and Trusts. 95 U. oF PA.
L. REv. 701 (1947).
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often reach contradictory results on the facts. Where taxes are involved,
the taxpayers will deliberately confuse the issue 2.8
The career of Col. Green, whose death tax problems gave rise to the
famous case of Texas v. Florida,"3 is typical, Born in Massachusetts, he
maintained a home there until his death. In the earlier years of his life,
he managed family business interests in Texas, and was prominent in that
state's business and political life. He also maintained an office in New
York, from which most of his business affairs were conducted. Finally, in
his old age, he purchased a home in Florida. Where was his domicil?
About all that can be definitely said was that he intended to travel.
Because of the exceptional circumstances that the total state death tax
claims against the estate, from the four states involved, amounted to more
than the estate - 37 million in tax claims against a 36 million dollar estate
- and that Texas was willing to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court by a suit against Florida, the conflicting claims as to domicil
were resolved by the Supreme Court (in favor of Massachusetts). But
this is the only case in which the court has consented to settle conflicting
claims of domicil.
In the Dorrance case,34 both Pennsylvania and New Jersey collected
full inheritance taxes, though neither state claimed any right to tax the
estates of non-residents. The result was reached because the courts of both
states held that Dr. Dorrance was a resident of that particular state, and the
Supreme Court refused review. If any doubt remained that no federal
question was involved in conflicting state decisions as to domicil it was
definitely set at rest by Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley.,3
The situation is thus analogous to that which obtained with regard to
the taxation of intangibles at death. If a solution is found, it must be
through voluntary state action. In 1944 the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws proposed both a Uniform Act on Interstate Arbitration of
32. "No lady with a million dollars living on East 90th Street in New York City
could possibly be domiciled there if the tax on her estate would be less were she domiciled
somewhere else." Surrogate Cohalan of New York, quoted in CCH STATE INHERITANCE,
ESTATE AND GiFT TAX SERVICE 1425B.
33. 306 U.S. 398 (1939). To duplicate the situation in this case, at present tax
rates, and thus get into the Supreme Court, it is estimated that the estate would have
to be in excess of $30,000,000 and at least four states would have to claim domicil.
Tweed and Sargent, op. cit. supra note 31.
34. In this litigation Pennsylvania and New Jersey collected death taxes of $15,620,-
793 and $14,394,698 respectively: Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 AtI. 303 (1932),
cert. denied, 287 U.S. 660 (1932); In re Dorrance's Estate, 172 At]. 900 (Pa. Super.1933), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 617 (1933); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 288 U.S. 618
(1933); in re Dorranee's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 At. 601 (Prerog. Ct. 1934),
supplementary opinion, 116 N.J. Eq. 204, 172 AtI. 503 (Prerog. Ct. 1934), cert. dis-
missed, 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 Atl. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1935), al'd, 116 N.J.L. 362, 184
At!. 743 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 692 (1936); Dorrance v. Martin,
12 F. Supp. 746 (D. N.J. 1935), aff'd, 296 U.S. 393 (1935)..
35. 302 U.S. 292 (1937). It has also been held that the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution does not require recognition of the finding as to domicil by
another state. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942). The situation is like
that in the divorce cases.
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Death Taxes, and a Uniform Act on Interstate Compromise of Death
Taxes.38 To date, both acts have been adopted by six states., 7 The tech-
nical problems in avoiding "double domicil" decisions have been met, and
it remains only for the same forces which secured the solution of the double
taxation of intangibles problem in the legislatures to secure action here.
A final problem remains to plague the estate planner, though it is
outside the scope of this paper. That is the problem of multiple taxation
of trusts, as permitted in Greenough v. Tax Assessors of City of Newport.8
In this case the court held that there was no constitutional objection, under
the 14th Amendment, to the levy of a property tax on a New York trust
at the co-trustee's residence in Rhode Island. The door to double taxation
of trusts, opened by Curry v. McCanless,39 permitting taxation at both the
decedent's and trustee's domicil, has been closed as to death taxes by the
exemption and reciprocity statutes discussed above. But there is no present
protection against the double levy of a property tax against the trust there-
after. The uniform acts expressly avoid touching on the problem of prop-
erty taxation. o The safe practical course is to name a corporate trustee
in a state such as New York, where the state has waived the right to tax
trusts established by non-residents in its own constitution or statutes. 41
From the foregoing, it may appear that the problem isn't a problem
any more. However, enough of a problem still remains to perhaps justify
an examination of the cases which led to the present situation. Further,
it may shed some light on the wisdom of the apparent contradiction in the
court's attitude, in that, even after the apparent success of its action in
turning the problem of intangible taxation back to the states, it still retains
constitutional barriers against double taxation of tangibles. 42
PRIOR TO 1905
It is important to note that the courts have been primarily concerned
with the problem of jurisdiction to tax. From this point of view, if the
36. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. (Pocket Supp.) 252, 259.
37. California, Maine, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Virginia, supra note
36. In addition, CCII STATE INRHERIrANCE, IESTATE AND Cuirr TAx SERVICE 12,035
lists the following states as having compromise and arbitration statutes not modeled after
the Uniform Act: Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Indiana, Massachusetts.
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma and Utah. The only
reported case so far under arbitration statutes is between Massachusetts and New Hamp-
shire in 1950, CCII INHERITANCE, ESTATE TAX SERVICE 17,141. It may well be
that generally no legislation is necessary for compromise, since that is an inherent power
of the Attorney-General's office. Cooley v. South Carolina Fax Comm'n, 204 S.C.
10, 28 S.E.2d 445 (1943), but statutory authorization for arbitration would appear to
be necessary. Another device is intervention by a state claiming domicil in the proceed-
hugs in another state. See Estate of Trowbridge, 266 N.Y. 283, 194 N.E. 756 (1935),
where Connecticut intervened in a New York proceeding, and secured a decision that
the decedent was domiciled in Connecticut.
38. 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
39. 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
40. Report of Special Committee on Double Taxationu of Intangibles, 9 UNWORNIil
LAws ANN. (Pocket Supp.) 253,
41. N.Y. CO NsT. Art. X'VI, § 3.
42. Supra note 25.
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state has jurisdiction, it is immaterial which sort of tax the state decides
to levy. Consequently, the doctrines have been developed in cases which
actually concerned both property taxes and death taxes.
Prior to the present century, the principal distinction made by the
courts with regard to property was between land and personalty. When
the planter moved, his land remained behind, but his slaves went with him.
For purposes of jurisdiction to tax, land was regarded as having a "situs"
within a particular state's territorial limits,43 whereas personal property was
regarded as moving with the owner. The latter concept was summarized
by the phrase, mobilia sequuntur personarn, and, under this doctrine, juris-
diction to tax all personalty was assigned to the state of the owner's domicil.
Since personalty was usually actually kept near the owner's domicil, there
was little incentive for states to compete with each other in taxing a de-
cedent's personalty.
In the latter half of the 19th century, however, the United States
underwent a rapid economic expansion. Intangibles, such as stocks and
bonds, were rapidly becoming the principal form of wealth in the country.
They attracted the attention of state collectors as a source of revenue.
Being mobile instead of fixed, a decedent's personalty was not confined
to the territorial limits of a particular state. Instead, it could be kept in
several states, with the result that more than one state could claim the
right to assess a tax. During this period the power of states to tax per-
sonalty located beyond the territorial limits was not questioned. The mobilia
rule continued in full force, and the courts made no distinction between
tangibles and intangibles for purposes of death taxation.
44
The early cases also sanctioned double taxation, starting with the prop-
osition that credits could be taxed both by the state of the creditor and
that of the debtor. In Kirtland v. Hotchkiss4 the court held that Connect-
icut could levy ad valorern property taxes on bonds owned by a Connecticut
resident and representing debts owed by residents of Illinois. The loans
had been made in Illinois and were secured by lands situated there. In
Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County46 a similar tax imposed by
Oregon, the debtor's state, was held valid in a case where the debt was
43. Marshall, C. I., "All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state extends,
are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, upon the soundest
principles, exempt from taxation." MeCtlloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 429 (U.S.
1819).
44. For a broad statement of the mobilia rule see Weaver's Estate v. Iowa, 110
Iowa 328, 330, 81 N.W. 603, 604 (1900): "That the legislature has power to impose
a tax on residents upon the personal property owned by them, no matter where the
same is situated, is conceded." Cf. Bittker, op. cit. supra note 30, at 643, citing Hoyt v.
Comm'rs, 23 N.Y. 224 (1861), for the proposition that: "Courts did, however,
show a marked tendency to construe statutes as not intended to include extra-territorial
chattels, particularly by refusing to apply the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam when
the statute embraced only property 'within the state' . . . or by declining to permit
double taxation in the absence of irrefutable evidence that the legislature intended it."
45. 100 U.S. 491 (18791.
46. 169 U.S. 421 (1898).
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secured by a mortgage held by a resident of California. Again, in Bristol
v. Washington County,47 a tax on credits by the debtor's state was upheld.
Here, a citizen of New York was engaged in the business of making loans
in Minnesota through an agent regularly employed there. In upholding
the tax, the court pointed out that "the business of investing and reinvest-
ing" money subjected the credits to taxation. In none of these cases was
the issue of double taxation discussed by the court.
In Blackstone v. Miller' the issue of double taxation was squarely
faced. In this case, the court held that New York, the debtor's state, could
impose a death tax on a bank deposit which had been in the state for more
than a year before the owner, an Illinois domiciliary, died. The court re-
fused to be persuaded by the argument that the deposit was only transitorily
present in New York, since it was held for re-investment in stocks which
were to be removed. Instead, the court held that while more than mere
temporary presence of a credit was necessary to establish jurisdiction 40 the
deposit was delayed within the taxing power of New York long enough to
justify a finding that it was not there temporarily. With respect to possible
taxation by Illinois, the creditor's state, Mr. Justice Holmes said: "No doubt
this power on the part of two states to tax on different and more or less
inconsistent principles leads to some hardship, . . But these inconsistencies
in frine no rule of constitutional law."
'he early cases dealing with tangible personalty were concerned chiefly
with moving chattels.5 0 Coe v. Errols' involved floating logs through New
Hampshire. They were delayed at the town of Errol because of low water.
The New Hampshire tax assessed against the logs was sustained, on the
ground that they were detained sufficiently long in Errol to break the inter-
state journey and acquire a taxable location there. In holding that the non-
resident owner was liable for the New Hampshire tax, Mr. Justice Bradley
said, "if the owner of personal property within a state resides in another
state which taxes hin for that property as part of his general estate attached
to his person, this action of the latter state does not in the least affect the
right of the state in which the property is situated to tax it also. It is hardly
necessary to cite authorities on a point so elementary."
The court followed this decision with two railroad cases, both upholding
the right of the state of actual location to levy taxes on railroad cars. In
47. 177 U.S, 133 (1900).
48. 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
49. The court's conclusion here was somewhat analogous to the "permanent loca-
tion" requirement established for chattels. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905) discussed infra.
50. It is to be noted that the principal constitutional objection raised in the "moving
chattel" cases has been the due process clause of the 14th Amendment rather than the
interstate commerce clause. Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292
(1944).
51. 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
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Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania"' an apportionecd ' 'H tax was upheld,
while in American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall ' a tax on cars actually
in the state on tax day was upheld.
1905-1937
The due process limitation on the jurisdiction of states to tax personalty
was first expressly imposed in Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky."' .
There Kentucky, the state of corporate domicil, sought to tax the transit
company on a fleet of railroad cars which were used almost entirely outside
the state. Drawing analogy to the case of foreign land, the court said:
"The argument against the taxability of land within the jurisdiction of
another state applies with equal cogency to tangible personal property
beyond the jurisdiction. It is not only beyond the sovereignty of the taxing
state, but does not and cannot receive protection under its laws."
It was in this case that Mr. Justice Holmes first expressed his doubts
as to the application of the 14th Amendment. As we have seen, these
doubts were destined to prevail, where intangible property was involved,
although not as applied to the precise situation concerning tangible property
with relation to which they were originally expressed.
After the Union Refrigerator Transit case, efforts were made to limit
the multi-state taxation of intangibles which had previously been approved.
In Hawley v. City of Malden,5" Massachusetts assessed a property tax
against a domiciliary of that state on stock of a foreign corporation which
owned no property and did no business in Massachusetts. In opposing the
tax the taxpayer pointed out that under the earlier case of Corry v. Balti-
more"17 the state of corporate domicil might also tax the stock as property
located in the state of incorporation-thus raising the issue of multi-state
taxation. The taxpayer argued that the stock had a "situs" in the state of
incorporation, and, under the Union Refrigerator Transit case, was not
taxable in Massachusetts. The court, however, re-affirmed Kirtland v. Hotch-
kiss" and held that the rule of the Union Refrigerator Transit case did not
apply to intangibles which could have no physical situs. The court here
52. 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
53. For detailed discussion of the "apportioinent theory" see Stone, C.J., dissenting
in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 308 (1944). For application of
this theory to ships operating on inland waters see Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line
Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
54. 174 U.S. 70 (1899).
55. 199 U.S. 194 (1905). Cf. Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188
U.S. 385 (1903). There the action was to recover certain taxes assessed against a ferry
company operating a service between Kentucky and Indiana. Kentucky, the domiciliary
state, had attempted to tax the Indiana franchiise granted by the latter state, where the
company was licensed to do business. In permitting a recovery the court held that
Kentucky's attempt to tax the Indiana Franchise amounted to a deprivation of property
in violation of the 14th Amendment.
56. 232 U.S. 1 (1914).
57. 196 U.S. 466 (1905).
58. 100 U.S. 491 (1879).
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pointed out that the state of corporate domicil had not actually taxed the
stock involved.
Two years later, in Bullen v. Wisconsin"0 the court again followed the
Kirtland case, and held that Wisconsin, the settlor's state, could tax a
trust in Illinois which the Wisconsin domiciliary had created, retaining
a power of revocation and a right to the income. Four years later, in
Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County0 the court refused to apply
the due process limitation in a case where the subject intangibles were
expressly alleged to have already been taxed once by the state where the
company's plant and business were located. Here, North Dakota had
assessed what purported to be a property tax on the intangible property
of a domestic corporation which had no property and did no business
in the state. The court, per Mr. Justice Brandeis, summarily treated the
taxpayer's contention that it was being subjected to double taxation by
saying: ". . . It is sufficient to say that the 14th Amendment does not
prohibit double taxation." Unless viewed as intended to overrule the
Union Refrigerator Transit case, this statement must be regarded as limited
to intangible property, which was the subject matter of the suit.
With regard to tangible property, two moving-chattel cases of this
period should be noted. The first is New York Central & H. R.R. v.
Miller.6' There, New York, the state of corporate domicil, assessed a
franchise tax against the railroad, measured by the full value of its freight
cars which were moving continuously in and out of the state. The court
sustained the tax, on the theory that no particular cars were shown to be
so continuously outside the state as to be protected by and subject to taxa-
tion in another state. The second case is Southern Pacific Co. v. Ken-
tucky."' Here, Kentucky, the state of corporate domicil, levied a tax on
a fleet of steamships owned by the taxpayer but permanently operating
on the high seas. It was physically impossible for the property to ever
enter Kentucky. Nevertheless, the court sustained the tax-apparently for
the reason that, having no taxable situs within any other state, the ships
would otherwise go tax free.
These limitations, coming from property tax cases, were first applied
to thie state's jurisdiction to tax tangibles at death in the leading case
of Frick v. Pennsylvania,3 which, as we have seen, is still adhered to."'
The real significance of the court's holding lay in the fact that the dis-
tinction between tangibles and intangibles was permitted to outweigh
the generally accepted tax view that, while a property tax may be con-
sidered levied "on" property, a death tax is levied on the privilege of transfer
59. 240 U.S. 625 (1916).
60. 253 U.S. 325 (1920).
61. 212 U.S. 584 (1906).
62. 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
63. 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
64. Supra note 25.
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or succession. 65  In the Frick case, the decedent, Henry C. Frick, died
leaving, among other assets, a $13,000,000 art collection. The collection
was permanently kept in New York City. Pennsylvania, the state of
decedent's domicil, attempted to tax the transfer as personalty passing
at death. The Supreme Court held that by reason of the character and
situs of the tangibles, the due process clause deprived Pennsylvania of
jurisdiction to tax. By so holding, the court established for both property
taxes and death taxes the same rule respecting state jurisdiction to tax
tangibles permanently located beyond the territorial limits.60
Nine years after the Frick case, the Supreme Court decided the con-
verse proposition in City Bank Farner's Trust Co. v. Schnader.6' Here,
a New York domiciliary loaned paintings to a Philadelphia museum for
exhibition under an oral agreement, terminable at will, whereby the paint-
ings could be sold for presentation to the museum. No definite time was
set for returning the paintings, and they were still in Pennsylvania when
the owner died nearly three years later. The court held that the paintings
were "permanently located" in Pennsylvania, within the Frick rule, and
had acquired sufficient taxable situs for Pennsylvania to tax their transfer
at death.
Swinging back again to the transfer of intangibles, we come to two
North Carolina cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1926-each episodic,
and neither to be relied on today. 'he first, Rhode Island Trust Co. v.
DoughtonR concerned the right of a state where a corporation does busi-
ness to impose a death tax upon corporate shares owned by a non-resident
to the proportionate extent of the business done in the state. The court
held that North Carolina was without jurisdiction to impose the tax, dis-
tinguisbing between the separate identities of the corporation and its share-
holders and holding that the former could not, by determining the business
situs of the corporation, create a basis for jurisdiction to impose a tax
on the latter. It is certainly doubtful that the court would reach this same
conclusion today6 '
65. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); United States Trust Co. v. Hel -
vering, 307 U.S. 57 (1939); Fernandez v. Weiner, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
66. The court held further that Pennsylvania could not justify the levy by arguing
that in taxing the transfer of Pennsylvania property the domiciliary state might include
as part of the basis of computation the value of extra-state tangibles. This too, the
court held. would violate the due process clause. The court distinguished Maxwell v.
Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919) which had sustained a state statute graduating tax rates
according to the value of the total estate, wherever located, but applying the rates so fixed
only to the part of the value within the taxing state. See Lowndes, Rate and Measure
in jurisdiction to Tax-Aftermath of Maxwell v. Bugbee, 49 Hlav. L. REv. 756 (1936);
-5 YALE L.T. 930 (1936).
67. 293 U.S. 112 (1934).
68. 270 U.S. 69 (1926).
69. See State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942) discussed
supra; Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931); Wisconsin v, J. C.
Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); Guterman. Revitalization of Multiple State Death
Taxation, 42 CoL. L. Rvv. 1249, 1275 (1942).
Mr. Guterman points out that under the Aldrich decision North Carolina could
reach the stockholders of foreign corporations doing business within its borders, by re-
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The second case, Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton0 involved
the attempt of the domiciliary state of a donee of a power of appointment
over property held in trust to tax its exercise. Here, a Massachusetts
decedent left property by will to a Massachusetts trustee, the income payable
to his daughter for life with a general power of appointment by will.
The daughter moved to North Carolina where she died, leaving a will
exercising 7' the power. The daughter's will was probated in North Carolina
and the state levied a death tax on the value of the appointed property.
The Supreme Court denied the power of North Carolina to tax. The
court referred to the rule in Massachusetts that the appointee takes from
the donor and not from the donee, and that the exercise of the power was
determinable only by the law of the donor's domicil. In so holding, the
court pointed out that the trust assets had no situs in North Carolina.
With respect to the exercise of the power in North Carolina, the court
said that the right was given to the donee by the donor's will, rather
than conferred by the law of the donee's domicil. 72
The Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia case,73 decided in 1929, fore-
shadowed the limitations on taxation bf intangibles which were clearly
enunciated in the Farmers Loan casc74 the following year. The Safe
Deposit & Trust case involved an attempt by Virginia to tax Virginia trust
beneficiaries on the value of the corpus of a Maryland trust rather than on
the value of their beneficial interests. The court denied the right of the
beneficiaries' domiciliary state to tax. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
Stone agreed with the result, but expressed the opinion that Virginia
could have taxed the beneficial interests as such upon a properly deteImined
value.75
quiring actual domestication as was required by Virginia in the Railway Express case.
In Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., the court permitted Wisconsin, where the foreign
corporation carried on business, to levy a tax on non-resident stockholders based on divi-
dends received out of income earned in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin law required the
corporation to deduct the tax from the dividends even though declared outside that state
in favor of non-resident shareholders. uTe court reasoned that this was merely an ex-
tension of the state's income tax which was levied on earnings within the state; the tax
here being levied on non-resident shareholders measured by income earned, not by them,
but by the corporation. To this degree, the corporate entity was disregarded. The bene-
fits and privileges of earning income in Wisconsin by means of a foreign corporation
were deemed sufficient to support the tax.
70. 272 U.S. 567 (1926).
71. For the proposition that non-exercise of a power of appointment may constitu-
tionally be taxed in the same manner as exercise of the power, see Saltonstall v. Salton-
stall, 276 U.S. 260 (1928).
72. The Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. ease was expressly overruled in Graves v.
Sehmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942) discussed infra. See Estate of A. B. Newton, 35 A.C.
881, 221 P.2d 952 (1950), overruling California cases which followed the Wachovia
case.
73. 280 U.S. 88 (1929).
74. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930) discussed infra.
75. In reliance on Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939) and Graves v. Elliott,
307 U.S. 383 (1939), both discussed infra, the court, in Commonwealth v. Stewart, 312
U.S. 649 (1941) upheld a Pennsylvania property tax assessed on the equitable interest
of a Pennsylvania resident in a trust in intangibles located in New York. In effect, the
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At the time the Frick case"' was decided, in 1925, and prior to the
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. 7 7 decision in 1930, the rule of Blackstone v.
Miller78 was in force permitting the multi-state taxation of intangibles.
Accordingly, one of the essential issues to be decided by the court before
due process limitations could be applied was whether the property taxed
was tangible or intangible.79 That is again the situation today, in view
of the Aldrich80 and Treichler8l cases. The court dealt with this question
at considerable length in the case of Blodgett v. SilberrnanY2 Here, the
court reversed a holding of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
that United States bonds belonging to a Connecticut decedent but located
in New York were tangibles and taxable only in New York. Instead, the
court followed Kirtland v. Hotchkiss a and held that Connecticut, where
the decedent was domiciled, could impose a death tax on intangibles which
included (1) a partnership interest in a New York firm, (2) certificates
of stock in foreign corporations and the United States bonds kept in
New York, and (3) a life insurance policy kept in New York. The court
did not indicate whether the intangibles might not also have been taxed
in New York, and merely referred to the "business situs" cases84 as having
"little or no bearing on the power of the state of a decedent's domicil to
tax the transfer of his bonds which we are now considering."8 5
Significant in the court's decision was the holding that "anything
having as its essence an indebtedness or a chose in action" could not be
regarded as a tangible for purposes of the Frick case. \Witli respect to
Curry and Graves v. Elliott cases overruled the Safe Deposit & Trust Co. case, See also
the discussion in the Greenough case, supra note 38.
76. 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
77. 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
78. 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
79. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7, comment b (1934).
80. 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
81. 338 U.S. 51 (1949).
82. 227 U.S. 1 (1928). This case is regarded as authority for the proposition that
the Supreme Court will review the state court's characterization of personalty as "tang-
ible" or "intangible." But see Mr. Justice Stone's concurring opinion in Pearson v.
McGraw, 308 U.S. 313 (1939): "As I am of opinion that there is nothing in the Con-
stitution to compel a state to treat federal reserve notes for tax purposes as chattels were
treated in Frick v. Pennsylvania . . . and as no reason has been advanced, even in Blod-
gett v. Silberman ...for a different view ... the iudgment should, I think, be reversed
on that ground." This statement is regarded in some quarters to be a recognition of a
state's right to make its own characterization of personalty, as tangible or intangible.
without review by the Supreme Court. For a case in which a state court assumed it had
that right, see In re Perry's Estate, 192 P.2d 532 (Mont. 1948) where the court held,
contrary to Blodgett v. Silberman, that a partnership interest was a tangible, so that such
an interest, owned by a California resident, was subjected to the Montana death tax.
83. 100 U.S. 491 (1879).
84. Case of the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300 (U.S. 1873);
New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S. 309 (1899).
85. Even earlier, in Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 (1916), discussed supra, it
had been held that Wisconsin, the decedent's domicil, could impose a death tax on the
transfer by revocable trust of securities held by a trustee in Illinois. The state of Illinois
also taxed the transfer and the court saw no objection to this, citing Blackstone v. Miller.
The Bullen case was never overruled, and the court relied on it in Curry v. McCanless,
307 U.S. 357 (1939) discussed infra.
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the court's power of review of jurisdictional issues there was in the opinion
a strong inference that a determination that an item of personalty is
tangible for purposes of state law will not he permitted to form the final
basis for a determination of the applicability of the Frick case.
The Holmes theory that there is no constitutional prohibition of
double taxation of personalty was completely, though only temporarily,
repudiated with respect to intangibles in 1930 and the years immediately
following; the initial blow fell in the Farmers Loan & Trust Co. case86
which specifically overruled Blackstone v. Miller 7 There, the court held
that Minnesota could not impose a death tax on the transfer of bonds
of the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul which belonged to the estate
of a non-resident decedent who died a domiciliary of New York, The
majority applied the due process limitation of the 14th Amendment to
strike down the Minnesota tax on the ground that the Union Refrigerator
Transit case8s and the cases following it were controlling. The court said:
"The bonds and certificates of the decedent had acquired permanent situs
for taxation in New York; their testamentary transfer was properly taxable
there but not in Minnesota.'""9
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stone said: "It is enough
that the transfer was effected in New York by one domiciled there and is
controlled by its law . . .Granting that the continued existence of the
contract rested in part on the law of Minnesota, the relation of that law
to the transfer in New York, both in point of theory and in every practical
aspect, appears to me to be too attemated to constitute any reasonable
basis for deeming the transfer to be within the taxing jurisdiction of
Minnesota."
Although Mr. Justice Stone did not concur in the majority's invoca-
tion of the 14th Amendment to apply a rule of single taxation to intangibles,
the effect of the decision was to place the transfer at death of both
tangibles and intangibles on an equal footing. Whether this new rule
applied also to "business situs" situations, to shares of stock and to
property taxes still remained open,
With regard to "business situs," the court decided the Beidler case9"
the same year. There, the taxing state contended that a "business situs"
for the intangibles in question had been established in South Carolina,
thus permitting their taxation there. The court examined the basis for
the non-domiciliary state's contention and denied the right to assert the tax.
86. 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
87. 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
88. 199 U.S. 194 1905).
89. In Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925) the court held that the state
peranently located outside the taxing state. At that time Blackstone v. Miller was dis
tinguished on the ground that intangible personalty was "on a different footing from
tangible property."
90. Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S, 1 (1930).
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Decided also in the same year was Baldwin v. Missouri.' Here, the
factual situation was similar to that in the Farmer's Loan. & Trust Co.
caseC 2 except that the paper evidence of the debts were kept in Missouri,
the taxing state, and some of the debts were secured by liens on Missouri
lands. The court threw considerable doubt or' the former holding in
Saving & Loan Society v. Multnomah County'" by holding the tax against
the estate of a New York decedent invalid.
The First National Bank of Boston v. Maine case, 4 decided in 1932,
applied the single tax rule to shares of stock. There, the court refused to
permit a non-domiciliary state to impose a death tax on shares in a domestic
corporation owned by the estate of a non-resident decedent 5
Still undecided was the question whether the due process limitation
was to be applied in the case of property taxes assessed on shares in a
domestic corporation owned by a non-resident.96 Before the court faced
this problem, however, it decided Senior v. Braden07 involving the question
of whether land trust certificates were "land or interests in land" or in-
tangibles. Ohio levied a personal property tax on land trust certificates
representing a domiciliary taxpayer's beneficial interest in foreign land,
the legal title to which was held by an out-of-state trustee, The trustee was
to hold and manage the realty for the benefit of the certificate holders
and to distribute the income or sale proceeds to them in accordance with
their interests. The state conceded that if the tax were assessed against
"land or interests in land" it would be unconstitutional. The court held
that the certificates were interests in land, and the Ohio tax was stricken
down as violating both the state and federal constitutions.
1937 TO DATE
In 1937 the court began to make inroads on the rule of the Farmers
Loan & Trust Co.98 and First National Bank of Boston99 cases, when an
effort was made to extend the doctrine to property taxes levied against
91. 281 U.S. 586 (1930).
92. 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
93. 177 U.S. 133 (19001,
94. 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
95. At the time the First National Bank of Boston case was argued, 37 states had
enacted reciprocity statutes exempting the local intangible property of decedents dom-
iciled in states which granted a similar immunity from death taxes. The constitutionality
of such legislation had been upheld in New York, in an opinion by Chief judge Cardozo,
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. New York Central R.R., 253 N.Y. 49, 170 N.E. 489
(1930).
96. See First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234 (1937) and Schuylkill
'rrust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U.S. 506 (1938) discussed infra.
97. 296 U.S. 422 (1935). For discussion of this case see Rodell, Woe Unto You
Lawyers 103-134 (1934); Bittker, op. cit. suora note 30, at 653-655: "An interest in land.
whether it is the interest of a mortgagee, unpaid vendor, equitable owner, beneficiary of
a trust, or whatever, has all the characteristics which, according to the court in the
Union Refrigerator Transit case, subject intangible property to taxation by the state of
the owner's domicil, while it shares none of the characteristics which were thought to
confer a parallel immunity on tangible property."
98. 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
99. 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
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intangibles both by the state of "business situs" and by the state of corporate
domicil.
In First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota,"' Minnesota, the state of "busi-
ness situs" levied a property tax on shares of a foreign corporation held
by Minnesota residents. Against the argument that the shares were taxable
only by the state of incorporation, the court held that the 14th Amendment
did not forbid the imposition of the tax by the state of "business situs."l' U1
The court recognized the right of the state of corporate domicil to tax
intangibles, "at least in the absence of activities identifying them with
some other place as their 'business situs'."
The reverse situation was presented in Schuykill Trust Co. v. Penn-
sylvania.0  1 Here the court sustained the power of Pennsylvania, the
state of corporate domicil, to tax local trust company shares which were
the propery of non-resident stockholders.
The effect of these two decisions was to reaffirm multi-state property
taxation of intangibles. However, the Farmers Loan & Trust Co. 03 and
First National Bank of Boston104 cases remained unquestioned with respect
to death taxes.
In the spring of 1939, the problem of multi-state taxation was again
presented to the court in three cases, all of which were decided the same day.
In the first, Newark Fire Insurance Co. v. State Board of Tax Appeals,or '
a curiously divided court asserted the power to determine the fact of "busi-
ness situs." At the same time some transitory doubt was cast upon the
multi-state property taxation of intangibles which had been so recently
re-established. Here, New Jersey had assessed a property tax on intangibles
of a domestic corporation. The tax was opposed on the grounds that the
intangibles were associated with the New York operations of the company
where a "business situs" was allegedly established. For this reason, the
taxpayer contended that the intangibles were only taxable in New York.
Mr. Justice Reed, writing for Chief justice Hughes and Justices Butler
and Roberts, avoided the question of permissible double taxation, and
held, upon a review of the facts, that the taxpayer did not have a "business
situs" in New York, and hence was taxable in New Jersey. The other four
Justices who participated pointed out the similarity to the situation in
Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks Co. 1I and said that the New Jersey
tax was valid regardless of whether or not the intangibles had a "business
situs" in New York.1
0 7
100. 301 U.S. 234 (1937).
101. Reaffirming Hawley v. City of Mfalden, supra note 56.
102. 303 U.S. 506 1938).
103. 280 U.S. 204 1930).
104. 284 U.S. 312 1932).
10K. 307 U.S. 313 1939),
106. 253 U.S. 325 1920).
107. For the proposition that an ad vatorem property tax can be assessed by the
state of "business situs," or "commercial domicil," against intangibles belonging to a
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The second and third cases, Curry v. McCanless'0 8 and Graves v.
Elliotl"" involved the imposition of death taxes on trust property by the
states of decedent's domicil. In Curry v. McCanless the decedent, a
resident of Tennessee, had transferred securities in trust to an Alabama
trust company, reserving a life estate in the income and the power to dis-
pose of the trust corpus by will. The settlor died leaving a will disposing
of the securities in trust to the same trustee but upon different terms from
those contained in the inter vivos trust. In Graves v. Elliot the decedent,
while residing in Colorado, created a revocable trust of intangibles to be
administered in that state. Later the settlor moved to New York, where
she died domiciled without having revoked the trust.
In both cases the taxes immediately considered by the court were
those assessed by the decedent's domiciles. In sustaining the Tennessee
and New York taxes the majority of the court, per Mr. Justice Stone,
held that the states in which the trusts were administered, Alabama and
Colorado, might also impose death taxes on the intangibles held in trust.
On this latter point there was no disagreement among the members of
the court. All of the Justices conceded that the assets were so "localized"
as to be taxable at the "trust situs."'10 Disagreement arose over whether
or not the principle of mobilia sequuntur personam should be applied to
hold the securities subject to taxes at the decedent's domicil. Since
taxation at the "trust situs" was conceded, validation of the taxes here
in issue would be tantamount to a removal of the due process limitation
on multi-state taxation of intangibles at death."' With respect to this
issue the court was confronted with two conflicting lines of cases. On the
one hand, the older cases, involving principally property taxes, took the view
that the due process clause did not proscribe multi-state taxation. On the
other hand, the Farmers Loan & Trust Co. and First National Bank of
Boston cases stood for the opposite proposition. Over the dissents of
justices Butler, McReynolds and Roberts, joined by Chief Justice Hughes,
the majority adopted the position taken by the earlier decisions, distin-
guishing the second line of cases as being exceptional and of very limited
application.
The die thus cast by the majority in 1939 set the stage for the State
Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich1 2 decison in 1942, discussed at the
foreign corporation carrying on its principal business in the taxing state, see Wheeling
Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
108. 307 U.S. 357 (1939). Alabama followed its victory in this case with the
adoption of a reciprocity statute, which specifically exempts trusts from taxation, ALA.
CODE, §§ 1118, 1119, adopted in 1940, obviously to protect trust business.
109. 307 U.S. 383 (1939).
110. Thus the policy and reasoning of the "business situs" cases was regarded by
the court as sound, and intangibles held in a state for purpose of trust administration
were considered to be in a position similar to the funds "invested and reinvested" by the
Minnesota agent in Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U.S. 133 (1900).
111. See Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, sura note 103, and First
National Bank of Boston v. Maine, supra note 104.
112. 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
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beginning of this paper. By thd time this decision was handed down,
Chief justice Hughes and Justices Butler and McReynolds, all of whom
had dissented in the McCanless and Elliott cases, were no longer on the
court. They had been replaced by Justices Murphy, Byrnes and Jackson.
Earlier in the same year in which the Aldrich decision was handed
down, the court had occasion to return to the problem of taxation powers
of appointment by the state of the donee's domicil. Previously, in 1926,
it had held that where the donor had died domiciled in another state,
the domiciliary state of the donee, who exercised the power by will, could
not assess a tax.ll& In 1942, the problem was reconsidered in Graves v.
Sehmidlapp.114  Here, a Massachusetts decedent left property in trust to
Massachusetts trustees with directions to pay the income to his son for
life with a general power in the life beneficiary to appoint by will. The
son died domiciled in New York, where he exercised the power by a will
duly admitted to probate in that state. New York assessed a tax against
the donee's estate, including in the gross estate the property appointed
under the exercise of the power. The New York court denied the state's
constitutional power to assert the tax on the grounds that the jurisdictional
limitations of the Wachovia Bank & Trust Co."tr case were controlling.
The Supreme Court reversed the New York decision and expressly
overruled the Wachovia case. The court based its decision on two grounds:
first, that the right to appoint the intangible was property in the donee's
hands where lie was domiciled and such disposition furnished a proper
occasion for assessment of a death tax no less than on the transfer of
property which he fully owned; second, that regardless of how the power
might have been exercised, it was in fact executed by a will probated in
New York, thus entitling the transfer to the protection and benefit of
New York law.1"
This trend reachied its climax in the Aldrich case, discussed at the be-
ginning of this paper. The principle of single taxation of intangibles,
established in the Farmers Loan & Trust Co. 17 and First National Bank
of Boston"" cases, and grounded upon the due process limitation of the
14th Amendment, clashed head on with the -lolnes view that the 14th
Amendment had nothing to do with the problem, enunciated in Blackstone
v. Miller"9 39 years before, and repeated in Baldwin v. Missouri,12 in a
dissent written during the last term in which he sat on the court. The
court divided seven to two in favor of removing the constitutional pro-
hibition against taxation of intangibles by more than one state.
113. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567 (1926).
114. 315 U.S. 657 (1942).
115. Supra note 113.
116. The decision is critized in Guterman, Revitalization of Multiple State Death
Taxation, 42 COL. L. R Y. 1249, 1269-1273 (1942).
117. Supra note 103.
118. Supra note 104.
119. 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
120. 281 U.S. 586 (1930).
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Finally, as we have seen, the court removed the constitutional
restraints on the levy of multiple property taxes against trusts in the
Greenough case' 21 but in the Treichler case'22 adhered to the view that
there was a constitutional prohibition against the taxation of tangibles
by the state of the decedent's domicil, if they were located outside the
state.
The actual results, in the adoption of state reciprocal legislation, or
in the omission of intangible personal property from the scope of the state
death taxes, appear to have justified the faith of those, who, like Mr. Justice
Holmes, felt that it was not the duty of the Supreme Court to remedy all
economic evils. With little friction, the states have proven themselves
able to meet the problem, after the Supreme Court left it in their hands.
Mr. Justice Jackson's fears of irresponsible state action, fortunately, have
not been borne out by events.
121. 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
122. 338 U.S. 251 (1949).
